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Key reports on the Balkans crisis from the pages of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy monthly

 

NATO’s “Other” Yugoslavia Losses and POWs Still Not Acknowledged, May 4, 1999

The New Rome and the New Religious Wars, Released April 29, 1999. Text Version

The New Rome and the New Religious Wars, Released April 29, 1999. Acrobat Version

Essential Public Policy Points Relating to the ISSA Mission to Yugoslavia, April 18-21, 1999

Lies, Hypocrisy, Obfuscation and Murder, 3, 1999

The Impact of US Domestic Issues on The US and Global Strategic Posture, 9-10, 1998

A Squandered Future; a Heritage Lost, 9-10, 1998.

Italy Becomes Iran’s New Base For Terrorist Operations, 4-5, 1998

 

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“Early Warning”, the Editorial, 3, 1999

Lies, Hypocrisy, Obfuscation and Murder

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor

For national or international policy-level analysis to be taken seriously, it must itself take the subject [of the particular analysis] seriously. Analysts must imbue their discussion with a sense of gravitas; they must, if they are to be considered part of the policy process, treat all statements by their own leaders as being of oracular significance, and those of opponents as being mendacious, devious, obfuscating and, well, partisan. Truth and justice belong only on “our” side; all else is suspect. Even when the fabled boy in the street cries “The King has no clothes”, the weight and pomposity of “analysis” and reporting — open and classified — is such that the boy’s cries will not be heard.

Today, given the seemingly instant and omnipresent nature of communications and surveillance, there is a belief that the truth of any situation will always emerge. But, as we discuss elsewhere in this edition, belief is most definitely not knowledge; belief does not equate to “fact”. What is now most apparent is that modern media technologies are most effective in reinforcing stereotypes, perpetuating “the Big Lie”, and in causing distraction and the extension of pseudospeciation (the transformation of an opponent, in one’s mind, into a lesser species, unworthy of equality with ourselves).

Defense & Foreign Affairs publications must take a different analytical path to journals and analysts from a particular country. Defense & Foreign Affairs publications have for 27 years been attempting to write impartial analysis for policymakers of all countries. So we must, from time to time, cry “the King has no clothes”.

It is time again to do so, even though the weight of popular and populist reporting is likely to mean that many readers will take offense.

The particular issue at this moment is the US-led military campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Most of the premises for the attacks were absolutely contrived by the Clinton White House, and have no basis in either fact nor in the interests of the US or the NATO states.

US President William Clinton, Vice-President Al Gore, Secretary of State Madeline Albright, National Security Advisor “Sandy” Bergerabsolute and unequivocal lies that their whole basis and motivation for the conflict must be questioned. These are not the kind of lies necessary to maintain operational security. These have been lies for “a greater purpose”: the protection of Mr Clinton and his team from exposure to scandalous truths about links between the intelligence services of the People’s Republic of China and the Clinton White House.

The US House of Representatives’ bipartisan blue riband Select Committee on US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, chaired by Congressman Christopher Cox (Republican, California) has studied for some time the issue of PRC intelligence links with the White House. It prepared a 700-page classified report (“The Cox Report”), which was due to be cleared by April 30, 1999, for release in a public version by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (FIAB) which reports directly to the President of the United States.

Ibecame clear some time ago that the FIAB was “dragging its feet” on declassification of the report, and Congressman Cox, still enmeshed in disputes with the White House as of this writing (April 7, 1999) said that the matter would be taken back into Congressional hands, and hearings on the report would begin in public by April 26. Clearly that was not going to happen, because of the war.

The White House, anxious to stave off, or minimize, the damage which this report will do — by revealing the extent of strategic advantage which the PRC has obtained from its intimate relationship with the Clinton-Gore White House — started the process in early March of “reviving an enemy” to ensure that, with a war ongoing, no politician or newsman could dare criticize the Commander-in-Chief, President Clinton, for fear of “dividing the country when we should all be supporting our men and women at risk in war”. And, indeed, the conflict has cost the lives of numerous US and NATO servicemen and women (as yet not announced by the Clinton Administration), not to mention the Yugoslav and (Kosovo) Albanian lives ruined or ended.

As well, there was probably concern that debate over the Cox Report be staved off until after the visit to the US of PRC Premier Zhu Rongji, who arrived in the US April 6, and, as well, to put off the debate until after the NATO Summit in Washington DC on April 23 and 24.

The result of all of this is that a war fever was generated by the White House, and to do this, enormous lies had to be told. Much of this is outlined in the article on page three: The New Rome and the New Religious Wars. Once air strikes were initiated, in defiance of intelligence estimates that such a series of attacks would be counterproductive, more lies became necessary.

Not just small lies. Lies of all magnitudes. Lies which did not even pretend to have a basis in fact. It became a policy of “say anything to get through the day”. In all of this, long-term US credibility began to erode. Russia and the PRC, among others, began moving once again into direct opposition to the US and the US-led West and NATO, warning of “a new world war” (the PRC concern). In other words, to save the day for the Clinton-Gore White House, the future was thrown away. Enemies were made, needlessly.

Others, such as the Iranian- and Sudanese-backed extremists, and the North Korean leadership, watch as the US fritters away its military assets and its political and diplomatic resources.

So here we are, steeped in lies, hypocrisy, obfuscation and murder. And all our futures are the poorer for it.

 

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Taken from “Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy”, 9-10, 1998

The Impact of US Domestic Issues on The US and Global Strategic Posture

This article was taken from the paper presented by the author at Strategy’98 conference in Washington DC, October 5-7, 1998.

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor

Shakespeare, predictably, had a few appropriate words. In The Rape of Lucrece, he notes: “... [G]reatest scandal waits upon greatest state.” And there is no question but that behavior which may pass unnoticed in everyday society may not necessarily be acceptable when conducted by a great public figure. Similarly, behavior by a state will have consequences in proportion to the greatness of the state coupled with its relationship to geopolitical focal points and/or to timing. There are two other maxims: one from basic physics, that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction; and the other from the profession of public relations which says “don’t screw up on a slow news day”.

A discussion of The Impact of US Domestic Issues on The US and Global Strategic Posture could not be more appropriately timed. We are today witnessing profound impact on US foreign and strategic policy as a result of domestic US political issues, but what is perhaps more important is that this has also been the case for the past six years, during which time there has been an equally profound influence on US strategic and foreign policy as a result of a complex domestic US political agenda revolving around the Administration of President William Clinton. In some instances, the worst may be over. Of course, it may not be. We should not think that what we are witnessing today has arisen as a tsunami — a sudden and unpredictable tidal wave — on the global strategic scene. We are merely witnessing a tumescence, a full growth, of the problem.

As with a medical diagnosis, it would be easiest, and perhaps it is most urgent, to determine and treat all the symptoms of the problem. And this is an urgent requirement for the strategic analysts of all states, including the United States. In other words, we all must be aware of any aberrant or unstable behavior on the global strategic scene by its major player, but more importantly, we must be aware of the condition or conditions which prompt the major power to act. Only by understanding the basis of decisionmaking in any target of study can we determine possible courses of action which will be taken, and their ramifications. In many ways, although modelling the matrix may be helpful, it is important to develop an understanding in one’s mind of the major firm pillars of — in this case — US strategic decisionmaking, and also the major variables. Even with this basic understanding, there are a host of unpredictable factors. It is our task, as analysts, to make sure that in a seriously fluid situation we are not taken by surprise, or that decisions which may not seem to make sense on the basis of known strategic objectives, or rationally-viewed requirements or threats can be understood and dealt-with in the most appropriate fashion.

An example of aberrant or non-standard decisionmaking was, for example, the US decision in January and February of 1998 to threaten the use of military force against Iraq for non-compliance with United Nations’ demands on disclosure regarding weapons of mass destruction. This decision, accompanied by significant political and military build-up, seemed to imply that a new dimension had arisen in the ongoing situation with Iraq; one which warranted severe military-political action. What seemed to confirm this was the fact that the British Government immediately supported the US move. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, however, had little difficulty in defusing the situation and winning the Iraqi compliance which had allegedly been withheld from the US. Significantly, immediately the UN Secretary-General had brought this “crisis” under control, another arose in the Balkans. Albanian secessionist guerilla groups attacked a Serbian Government police outpost in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia and, in the ensuing fighting, massive US indignation and preoccupation occurred.

It would be easy to say that this is merely the world going about its usual business. And indeed, it would be foolish to say that world events are being orchestrated in some vast conspiracy. But we must be aware that the arrival of certain crisis points, or opportunities, presents decisionmakers with decisionmaking options.

Events in Iraq, in December, January and February 1998, certainly provided the US Government with an “option” to take some kind of action. The question which then becomes the issue is whether the action which was taken was strategically appropriate.

Whether or not it was strategically appropriate — and it is my contention that it was not — the motivation for the US escalation came timed to coincide with the release of explosive new information which began the current phase of the Whitewater scandal which has beleaguered President Clinton: the Monica Lewinsky affair. But there was even more happening to concern the President than even the Lewinsky affair, although none of us (including Mr Clinton) could have known just how far-reaching the Lewinsky issue could be in terms of its impact on the US decisionmaking apparatus.

There were a number of domestic issues, all working against the interests of the Clinton Administration, all coming to a head as 1997 closed and 1998 began. Many of them were indeed overlooked as one issue piled atop another and claimed both the attention of the public in the US and also the policymakers. These included potentially damning evidence of Clinton involvement in the Whitewater scandal, evidence which has in fact yet to surface in any politically-meaningful way, involving the testimony of former Clinton associate James McDougal. In the midst of the problems with Iraq, McDougall died on March 8, this year, which effectively silenced his testimony. But there were other issues building, like the degree of involvement of the intelligence service of the People’s Republic of China in funding for, and penetration of, the White House, whether via the Democratic Party or by more direct means. Tied to this, of course, was the related question of what the White House might have done for the People’s Republic of China, over and above the dictates of normal diplomacy. The matter of whether the White House had sanctioned the transfer of sensitive technology to the PRC, for example: technology of assistance to the PRC’s strategic ballistic missile program. As well, the question of how the White House handled the PRC’s proposed military intervention — and actual military build-up — against the Republic of China on Taiwan in April 1996 is also open to interpretation when it is viewed in the light of Beijing’s financial penetration of the Clinton Administration.

None of this was merely of passing interest. There was much discreet talk on Capitol Hill early this year about the prospects that President Clinton would be investigated, and possibly impeached, on the grounds of treason related to this subject. That the Lewinsky scandal broke, leading to more palatable charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, may in fact have been a relief to US politicians and to officials in the Administration.

As I noted earlier, world events take their own course and, naturally, require responses from various governments. The Iraqi situation had some elements of “business as usual”. But it defies belief that the profusion of threats emerging to President Clinton’s very existence as a President of the United States could not have influenced his behavior on the global political scene. At best, it would be assumed that his attention would have been diverted and his decisionmaking abilities paralyzed; his influence over Congress diminished; his prestige internationally undermining his authority.

If we take it for granted that there was substance in the US need to threaten Iraq militarily in January and February of this year, and if we see that Iraq has, in fact, subsequently not complied with requests for more candid disclosure of its chemical and biological weapons programs since that time (as UN inspectors have maintained), then why had the US not returned to the scene with renewed military threats? The Iraq problem had not gone away, and nor had it changed its dimension in the months from January 1998 through September 1998. Iraq promised compliance to the UN Secretary-General in February, but, reportedly, had done little in reality to comply since then. In other words, the threat which caused the US to threaten massive military action in January remained and, with the passage of time and the continuation of Iraqi work on these weapons, must have worsened. And yet the US had not strategically responded.

The conclusion which must be drawn, then, is that the original US action was not so much justified by the Iraqi threat as by the need of the US President to move based on other motives. The fact is that James McDougall went public with his claim of proof of Clinton links to Whitewater, and the Lewinsky scandal started to break, all immediately before the Clinton White House pointed to the horizon and said that the Iraqis were the “fourth greatest threat” to world peace — or similar words — and literally led the media by the nose away from the domestic problems. Any intelligence analyst worth his salt will aver that there is only so much coincidence which can be accepted as just that: coincidence.

Now it may be that there is a pressing strategic case, from a US or Western perspective, to take counterforce action against Iraq for non-compliance on the weapons disclosure issue. But I believe that most foreign governments, and most US servicemen and service chiefs, would feel better if they believed that military action — which inevitably takes innocent collateral lives at the target end and risks the lives of US and perhaps Allied servicemen — was decided based on credible threat assessment undertaken with the sole aim of improving the security of the perpetrator. At what point do allies, and US servicemen, say: “Are we just risking our lives and killing possibly innocent civilians merely to help preserve one politician in office?”

But more than this, when the US strikes at targets without true strategic, moral or legal justification, sooner or later the moral authority and prestige of the United States is eroded. In the case of Iraq, it does not take a sophisticated thinker to ask the question: If you believe that the Iraqis are not disclosing where they have their chemical and biological weapons sites, then how can you have the correct targeting information to strike these sites militarily? On the other hand, if you do, in fact, know where they are, then perhaps the weapons inspectors already have sufficient information to begin making definitive charges against Iraq.

When Secretary-General Kofi Annan mediated a quick end to the February 1998 “crisis” with Iraq, the US Presidency was still embattled at home, and his troubles were returning to the front page. Significantly, another “dance partner” was quickly found in the convenient and already-demonized Serbs, who were alleged to be undertaking somehow illegal actions to suppress the population of ethnic Albanian illegal immigrants in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia. Radical ethnic Albanian guerilla groups, who have also undertaken conventional terrorism in Kosovo, have for some time been receiving overt US political support and covert assistance in the provision of weapons and possibly training. Suddenly, when Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was no longer an immediate threat, actions arose in Kosovo. The US responded immediately, with threats and blustering. A full-scale military exercise — on the borders with the Kosovo area of the Yugoslav state of Serbia — was staged in neighboring Albania to rattle sabers at Yugoslavia. The press in the US complied with the Clinton Administration’s wishes and once again gave page one over to the foreign crisis. It is significant that the Clinton Administration had embraced the Kosovo cause even though the separatists were funded by Iran and are radical Islamists, opposed to the US and the West.

Now it is true that both Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošovic feel that they “understand” how the US works, and feel that they can manipulate or work with the US political system. In fact, neither realize how wrong they are for the most part. In general, they don’t even understand why the US is hammering them. The fact that Saddam was saved by Kofi Annan in February was pure good fortune for Iraq.

The matter of baseless US military action against foreign targets was raised again in August with the strikes — on the night of August 20, 1998 — at an alleged “chemical weapons” laboratory in Khartoum, in the Sudan, and against facilities used in Afghanistan by alleged terrorist Osama Bin Laden. The strikes, in response to the bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, using conventionally-armed Cruise Missiles launched from naval platforms, would have cost the US Defense budget in the vicinity of a quarter of a billion dollars. And this at a time when the real fighting strength of the US Armed Forces is under serious threat because of budget cuts. Once again, significantly, there was great selectivity in the timing of the action and the targets selected. The fact that the August 20 strikes were openly and derisively called “Operation Monica” around the Washington national security community shows the extent of cynicism about Presidential motives with regard to this issue.

It is important to note that, as recently as late September 1988, high-ranking sources in the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which is tasked with investigating the crime of the bombings of the embassies, noted: “We can’t tie the bombings to [Osama Bin Laden] yet.”1 In other words, punishment for the crime was meted out before due process could be undertaken.

Clearly, the US public was clamoring for some kind of “action” in response to the bombing of the two US Embassies, in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam, a few weeks earlier [on August 7, 1998]. Even if the US President had not been beleaguered by scandals at home it is likely that some kind of action would have been undertaken, merely to quieten domestic critics. And clearly, this quarter-billion dollar exercise was just a public relations exercise, mostly for domestic US consumption. Militarily, it just did not stack up. Sources within the US Defense Department indicated that the operational-level analysts felt that they could not sign-off on the targets selected, particularly in Sudan, because they could not be verified as actual military targets, nor targets related to terrorism.

The so-called “chemical weapons” facility in Khartoum was a commercial pharmaceutical laboratory which most certainly could have been used to make components for chemical weapons. But so could any such facility, and those who know the owner of the bombed plant know that he was a pro-Western businessman and “the opposite of anyone who would support the Islamists”.2 Indeed, White House National Security Advisor Sandy Berger went from saying that the facility had the capability to make chemical weapons precursors (which is true) to saying that it was an actual chemical weapons facility (which was not true). And even if it had been a chemical weapons facility, fully-fledged, the question which was never asked was: What did this target have to do with the bombing of the US embassies?

The New York Times of September 30, 1998, said: “Few national security issues in Clinton’s presidency were handled with greater secrecy or by a smaller group of people. The Administration was determined to avoid leaks, and that meant limiting deliberations to the ‘small group’, the President’s innermost circle.”3 It went on to say that “many people inside and outside the US Government began to ask whether questionable intelligence had prompted the United States to blow up the wrong building”. The Times also said that in January 1996, the CIA formally withdrew more than 100 of its intelligence reports on the Sudan after concluding that their source was a fabricator”.

What we are seeing, then, are military actions being launched against often spurious targets for the sake of US domestic political considerations. Once again, this is nothing new and certainly nothing invented by the Clinton Administration. Former US Central Intelligence Agency intelligence professional and writer Miles Copeland many years ago said that US foreign policy is merely domestic policy carried out abroad. He often noted that it was perfectly acceptable for a US President to order strikes which would kill scores of people in a

Again, a parallel case could have been made for the British Empire at its height in the 18th, 19th or 20th Centuries. Might is right. Or, at least, might can ensure that no-one questions its right.

What must be considered today, however, is the extent to which the current US domestic political crises impact upon US strategic policies.

Firstly, we have seen this Administration use foreign policy issues to distract from domestic political problems almost since the inception of the Clinton era, six years ago, and more emphatically since the appointment of Independent Prosecutor Kenneth Starr to probe possible Clinton illegalities some 4½ years ago. And, in saying that, I mean that this Administration has used such tactics far more than was the case with any earlier US administrations.

Secondly, it is necessary to state quite emphatically that merely because the White House — the decisionmaking leadership of the State — undertakes such action does not mean that purposeful, professional officials within the Intelligence Community, the Defense Department and the State Department do not strive with all their might to create and build a credible, rational strategic policy and demeanor for the United States. How many of them, however, are in the position of former Defense Secretary Dr William Perry to be able to resign rather than go on struggling to transform a strategic program based on political self-preservation into something which makes sense for the US and its allies? Very few. Many, particularly within the Armed Forces, become more than happy to merely narrow their focus and “just follow orders” and believe the Commander-in-Chief when he says that “this is the enemy”, and “these are the villains”.

Given the vindictiveness of this Administration against its domestic “enemies”, few can openly oppose even arbitrary decisions by the White House leadership. Even worse, the Intelligence Community labors to produce credible intelligence, but very reliable sources confirm that only intelligence which fits the argument of the day gets a hearing in the White House. Indeed, the waste of a quarter-billion dollars of taxpayers’ money on the recent Sudan and Afghan raids pails into insignificance when it is realized that the tens of billions of dollars spent on the Intelligence Community are to an overwhelming degree totally wasted when none of the real intelligence product is even allowed to impact on the national policy process.

So it boils down to this: the world’s most powerful state with the most expensive and arguably technically most capable intelligence services is stumbling around the world strategic arena blind, and making ad hoc and arbitrary decisions, for the most part, based on whim rather than professionally-considered intelligence estimates. And, in any event, the US intelligence services are so failure-averse that no-one dares even risk a bold assessment or a projection of what might, or might not, happen anywhere in the world.

Despite the fact that the US Armed Services remain the world’s most potent, they have undergone a decline in real terms over the past decade, to what Senator John McCain of the US Senate Armed Services Committee called “their worst level since the 1970s”.4 He said that the US now had “half the force and twice the commitments” of recent years. But the point which he made as he prepared to open a round of hearings on September 29, 1998 on US Military Preparedness was that he felt that now he would get greater candor from Armed Forces chiefs who were to testify. Senator McCain felt that he would see the Chiefs of Staff more openly discuss the problems they faced in the military. When asked why, he said that the White House, because of the scandals which had besieged it, did not have the power it had earlier in 1998 to compel the silence of the Chiefs of Staff.5

Very directly, then, the impact of the domestic political crises in the US has had a bearing on the readiness of US forces in their global rôle. Senator McCain felt that he could use the hearings as the basis for voting through Congress several billions more dollars to support the Armed Forces.

Given all this, what, then, can we expect in foreign policy decisionmaking terms from the Clinton Administration in its maximum possible remaining life of two years?

Firstly, it can be assumed that no major strategic threats will be confronted unless the threat so squarely engages the US that direct action is unavoidable. This means that, for example, unless North Korea actually takes action against South Korea, then the US will do nothing substantive to curb Pyongyang’s flagrant and now open build-up of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. And this, despite the fact that President Clinton said some years ago that the US would “not tolerate” the acquisition of strategic weapons, including nuclear weapons, by the DPRK or Iran. In other words, the US will not, during the Clinton period, willingly tackle any of the major problems confronting the West, the US or the world.

Secondly, low-profile countries can expect little, if any, interference by the US, other than by career bureaucrats, although many of these officials have considerable actual power below the threshhold of political attention. That means that, despite the fact that, say, Ethiopia continues to violate human rights, it will still get some US support because a US Federal program, once having obtained funding, will continue until someone actually notices and stops it. So, it will be business as usual for most foreign policy instruments, including NATO. Any changes which will be brought about will be wrought at the insistence of the US Congress, which presently has better and more reasoned analysis available to it than the Administration, for reasons noted earlier.

Thirdly, because the present Administration is concerned only at using foreign policy for the accretion of domestic political prestige, or to postpone domestic political criticism, or to rebuild credibility domestically, virtually the only foreign policy changes which will occur will, as noted earlier, come through Congress. And, as long as the policies do not work against the Administration, there will be little White House interest in vetoing them.

Fourth: high-profile, but weak, problem countries, such as Iraq, Sudan, Libya and “Serbia”, will continue to be on the hot list. No matter what the leaders of these countries do, they will not be removed from the list of hostiles. The White House needs publicly-recognizable enemies who can be brought to life at a moment’s notice. Significantly, those hostiles who have real credibility and strength, such as Iran and the People’s Republic of China, will be spared from White House action, almost regardless of what they do to oppose US policies and interests around the world. Possibly because they are in a position to strike back, or because the Clinton team feels a special regard for them.

All of this leads to the conclusion that no balanced and comprehensive US strategic policy — that is, US foreign policy and global strategic action — can, within the next two years, occur based on the age-old criteria of “national interest”. I believe that this is an accurate and conservative statement of affairs. For different reasons, the same could have been said of the Carter Administration in the late 1970s.

None of this should suggest that the political appointee-level policymakers in the Clinton Administration are totally bereft of ideological commitment to some of the strategic policies which they implement, or that there is no “logical” basis for their actions. But included in this “logical basis”, we must look at the impact of political lobbying by US interest groups.

To begin with, the Clinton White House has been convinced, since it came into office, that the key to continued progress in the US was — as they sloganized during their first election campaign — “the economy, stupid”. In other words, if the US public feels secure and well-fed, it will continue to support the Administration. This meant that the Administration has been committed to low energy prices to consumers and low consumer-goods prices. This in turn has meant ensuring that no crisis would arise with Iran, or with Iran over Saudi Arabia, which would automatically boost gasoline prices at the consumer pump in the US. It also meant ensuring a constant flow of cheap consumer goods from the People’s Republic of China, and indeed the flow of an enormous range of low-cost consumer goods into the US from China has grown significantly in recent years. International Strategic Studies Association Research Director Yossef Bodansky highlighted this several times immediately following the first Clinton presidential victory six years ago.

While this may equate to a philosophical belief, or part-ideology, on the part of the Clinton team, it also responds nicely to lobbying from, for example, California and other firms (particularly in the oil arena) who have made strong financial commitments to the Clinton election campaigns. California, it should be remembered, is a “swing” state, and therefore one which the Administration cannot afford to ignore.

But if this is the essential basis for the Clinton Administration’s willingness to allow China and Iran to continue an essentially anti-Western path unchallenged, then it also demonstrates the lack of any underpinning strategic understanding on the part of the White House National Security team. The Clinton Administration has taken a path which shies away from resolving US-Iranian differences, but rather takes a course which allows Iranian leaders to believe that they can disregard the US with impunity. I noted earlier that there was a prediliction evident in the White House — by which I mostly mean the National Security Council — toward receiving only the kind of intelligence and analysis which supports existing positions. But much of this also reflects the fact that the President, who sees foreign policy merely as a tool to support domestic political positions (as opposed to supporting the US strategic needs), has appointed possibly the least-qualified National Security Advisor in recent years: Samuel (Sandy) Berger. Mr Berger’s appointment reflects the lack of priority which the Administration gives to strategic matters, and highlights the fact — because of Mr Berger’s long personal association as a supporter of Mr Clinton — that the post is used as a tool to support President Clinton’s personal agenda.

This is by no means a complete picture of how and why domestic political issues affect the current US global strategic position, nor is it a fully-representative picture of just how seriously US and Western strategic positions have been eroded by the phenomenon I have described. More importantly, in the short time available, it has not been possible to fully document the impact which this phenomenon has had on the path, policies and wellbeing of other states, particularly the smaller states.

We need only look at the ramifications of former US President Jimmy Carter’s targeting of the Shah of Iran on the alleged grounds of human rights abuses to see the ramifications to the global strategic balance. Mr Carter wanted to show the US public that he was strong in the defense of human rights around the world. Perhaps he even believed that he knew what he was doing. But the result of his undermining of the Shah of Iran was a revolution which has cost hundreds of thousands of lives; which has undermined the human rights of all Iranians; which caused the Iran-Iraq War and the massive cost in human life and suffering; which led to the Gulf War of 1990-91; which caused the Iranian-led proselytization in the years since 1979 and has given us the radical Islamist war against the West; and so on.

There are grave consequences for the entire world when a US president undertakes strategic initiatives globally merely as an ad hoc measure to improve his domestic political survival. When the President of the United States sneezes, the world catches cold.

 

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1
US News and World Report, September 28, 1998.

2
Discussions with US citizen Dr Richard Stevens, former professor in the Sudan; plus news reports.

3
The New York Times, September 30, 1998: “Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise”, by Tim Weiner and James Risen.

4
Fox Morning News, Channel Five television, Washington DC, September 29, 1998.

5
Ibid.


Early Warning”, the Editorial, 9-10, 1998

A Squandered Future; a Heritage Lost

By Gregory R. Copley, Editor

Karl von Clausewitz, writing in his treatiese,Vom Kriege (On War), noted: “War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means.” And wars have been conducted for the most varied of reasons throughout history. Not all of them have reflected great wisdom; not all of them have been conducted for the benefit of the nation or state in whose name they have been waged. The only difference today is that the world, so recently brought under the overwhelming influence of Western culture since the end of the Cold War, has accepted that the conduct of nations should fit a legal, ethical and moral framework. And within this context, the conduct of war itself theoretically should have a basis in international law.

When the legal, ethical and moral frameworks for the conduct of international relations become flawed, so then does the prestige of the nations conducting such flawed policy become open to question. And when moral authority fails, only the heavy hand of military authority will suffice to sustain leadership. That is fast becoming the situation in which the world finds itself.

The end of the Cold War in 1990-91 should have opened a period of peace and an era in which diplomatic progress could have replaced fear as the most significant factor in international relations. It was not to happen, largely because the world had not prepared for peace; had no concept of what to do after the Cold War. We are already paying a heavy price for this. The lessons which we had learned were forgotten, and therefore the lives of many wasted. And in the forgetting of lessons, a heritage has been lost.

It was with the outbreak of a kind of peace at the end of the Cold War that complacency set in; the old Cold Warriors departed and a new generation came to power in the West. Leaders such as William Clinton, in the US, and Tony Blair, in Britain, have demonstrated that they had not paid attention during the past 40 or 50 years; nor had they read history. They began to rule by cliché and populism, without subtlety and without the comprehension of risk nor with regard to the future.

A crisis began in the Balkans in 1991 because of history, it is true. Germany failed to comprehend the continuing impact of the Third Reich, which ended in 1945, and went ahead to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. But the United States today perpetuates the crisis, with the backing of Britain. Under the leadership of Prime Minister John Major, who preceded Blair, Britain had acted as a moderating influence; today that moderating influence on US military action is gone. And, yes, the Balkans could once again act as a crucible for wider conflict.

Today, rather than think more deeply about a future rôle for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US and Britain are content to think that tasks such as military interference into the affairs of sovereign states without a declaration of war is strategically logical and ethically justifiable. But the perception of NATO as a retrograde and bullying body instead emerges on the world stage. Today, the US attempts to use the United Nations (UN) as a legitimizing tool for foreign military intervention when it is clear that it in most cases bends the will of that body in order to obtain its authority.

In these actions, both NATO and the UN are severely weakened, perhaps terminally. In the case of the mis-use of NATO, it merely becomes a tool under which East-West divisions re-open; and Russia, albeit weakened, once again finds no option but to become the now-unwilling advserary of the West. In the case of the UN, the claim by the US and UK that they acted with United Nations’ blessing in the December 1998 military attacks on Iraq is so questioned internationally that the already-eroding authority of the UN is further weakened.

We are in an age when national sovereignty is already a blurred concept. The UN was meant to both reinforce the sovereign supremacy of the nation-state and yet allow for collective decisionmaking. It is true that the technology of communications, and the pervasive communication of trade has already undermined the sovereignty of nations. This phenomenon has laid open the borders of all states; now, in the absence of a credible UN to protect them, a juggernaut of political and military power rolls across these unguarded frontiers. And if US President William Clinton is to blame for much of this, as he uses foreign adventurism to obfuscate his problems at home, then the UK’s Tony Blair shares the blame. Where once London moderated and ameliorated Clinton’s actions; she now — like the devoted wife of a drunk who herself takes up drinking to avoid losing her husband altogether — joins with Clinton and empowers him.

The actions of the Blair Administration in undermining the protocols governing the treatment of guests — illustrated in the ongoing detention of former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet in the UK — similarly shows that history has not been read, nor the reason for the evolution of diplomatic practice comprehended. In all of this, history is forgotten, and thus a world may be lost.

 

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From: Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 4-5, 1998

Terrorism and the Balkans:

Italy Becomes Iran’s New Base For Terrorist Operations

Iranian Islamists have established an effective terrorist infrastructure in the Balkans region. Its axis runs from Albania, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Italy. There, a forward operations center in Milan is preparing to export terror into Western Europe. Senior Editor Yossef Bodansky uncovers this clandestine web which has already attempted the assassination of Pope John Paul II.

At the international conference on Bosnia in Bonn on December 10, 1997, the US made a strenuous effort to expand the definition of the “Bosnian problem” to include all Muslim “causes” in the Balkans. Indeed, the Conference’s final declaration included a US-inspired warning about the dire effect of the “escalating ethnic tensions” in Kosovo: a province of Yugoslavia which has nothing to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) or the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

A leader of the Bosnian Serb delegation, Momèilo Krajisnik, observed that by riding on the sympathy to the Bosnian Muslims, the conference “tried to sneak the Kosovo issue through the back door” into the center-stage of international politics. Indeed, populated with an ethnic Muslim Albanian majority, Kosovo is fast becoming the new “darling” of the US Clinton Administration’s Balkans policy.

Moreover, the White House’s recent discovery of the Kosovo issue as a political priority comes at the time when terrorism and subversion inspired by Islamists are spreading and escalating among Albanians in Kosovo, Macedonia (FYROM), and Albania itself. This recent escalation is the most visible component of the first phase of Tehran’s long-term plan, currently being implemented. This plan includes intense preparations for the eruption of hostilities in Kosovo. Moreover, these activities could not have taken place but for the consolidation of Iranian presence in Albania. Another significant aspect of this effort is Iran’s maintenance of a command structure in Italy run by a veteran terrorist now serving as a senior Iranian diplomat.

The current escalation of sectarian violence in Kosovo is not a sudden event, but a result of thorough preparations in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as throughout the Muslim World. [Outside the scope of this article, these activities are described in great detail in the author’s book Some Call It Peace, pp. 155-160.]

The significance of the Iranian activities in Albania and Kosovo is in their larger context: the growing importance of both the Balkans-based infrastructure as the Islamists’ primary entry point into Europe, as well as the establishment of an Iranian intelligence, command and control center in Italy. There has been an overall increase in significance of the Italy-Balkans infrastructure since the Spring of 1997, because tensions between Iran and West European states grew in the aftermath of the verdict in the Mykonos trial, and local security forces now pay more attention to Iranian activities. Meanwhile, the dynamics in B-H compels Iran and the Izetbegovic Administration to keep a low profile in order not to alienate the Europeans to the point of refusing to go along with the US-imposed policies.

The first demonstration of the capabilities of the Italy-Balkans system, its sophistication and resilience, was an attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II in the Spring of 1997. In March, Ayatollah Khamene‘i chaired a special meeting of the Special Operations Committee which scrutinized the details of the proposed operation and assessed its importance. Significantly, despite the backlash throughout Western Europe of the early-April Mykonos verdict, Tehran determined that the operation was too important to be called off. Indeed, teams of the Special Missions Division continued to inspect and activate Lebanese, Turkish, Algerian and Moroccan squads and teams in Italy and elsewhere in Europe.

Significantly, the operation was conducted even though the new “nerve center” of Iranian intelligence, located in Milan, was not yet ready and thus not used in support of the operation. Several elements of the Mahdi Chamran’s External Intelligence took part in the operation. Most important were: clandestine elements of the al-Quds forces “that take care of [terrorist] attacks and military operations abroad”; special units of the Internal Security Department; and the rear/safe-haven logistical base in Sarajevo from where the foreign terrorists began their operations. An Islamist terrorist, presently held in Western Europe, identified Mahdi Chamran operating with the nom de guerre Mehid Sharam, as the head of this structure.

The operation which prompted Tehran to activate the fledgling European operations center was the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. This operation was launched after a detailed pre-mission briefing had taken place in the Hammamet Hilton in Tunisia. Working with an unusually precise intelligence warning, the Italian security forces had been searching for Islamist terrorists, both agents already in-country and agents known to have been arriving since early Spring. This force, in excess of 20 or 30 expert terrorists identified as “close to the Iranian HizbAllah”, was known to be plotting bomb attacks against Pope John Paul II as well as at airports.

At its core was a “suicide commando group trained in Bosnia” comprised of 18 terrorists. They arrived in Italy via Rome’s Fiumicino airport after traveling through several third countries. The key terrorists were from Turkey (including Islamist Kurds), Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Iran. Some of them arrived in Italy by air from Turkey and elsewhere, while others arrived by ship from Tunisia. The detonators were smuggled from Germany, both commercially and in Iranian diplomatic mail.

The main mission of this terrorist force was to assassinate the Pope by exploding a car bomb along a route he was to take in Rome. The car, with stolen diplomatic license plates, was to be parked under the colonnade in St. Peter’s square at a point along the itinerary habitually used by the Pope. The car bomb could be exploded by both a martyr inside and by remote control from a nearby observation post.

Tehran planned on the attack on the Pope being the curtain-raiser for a campaign of terror throughout Western Europe. Several Iran-sponsored Islamist terrorist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Italy, France and Germany were known to be planning attacks in Europe. The forward operational base of the entire campaign was in Milan, from where communications with the rear headquarters in Bosnia were maintained.

Ultimately, the high-level, countrywide security alert and manhunt, which was later extended to Western Europe, deterred the terrorists and prevented the assassination. Yet, as a testimony to the efficacy of the Iran-sponsored terrorist system, all the terrorists known to have been involved in Italy escaped. If the counter-terrorist operations had successfully prevented the attack on the Pope, they had failed to unearth and destroy the Iran-sponsored terrorist infrastructure in Italy. The entire network simply went underground.

In late September 1997, Tehran’s Italian network was ready to make another attempt on the Pope’s life. A network of some 20 terrorists — Croats, Bosnians, Tunisians, Algerians, and Moroccans — was organized in Bologna. The key members of this network were former mujahedin who had fought in Bosnia. The network’s commander, a Moroccan citizen, arrived from Spain on the eve of the operation with up-to-date instructions. The network had logistical support from local networks affiliated with Algeria’s Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA). The operational plan called for repeated attempts to hit the Pope between his arrival at Bologna airport and the cathedral where he was to attend the congress of the Congregation of the Holy Sacrament. Italian security forces located and arrested 14 members of the network just a few hours before Pope John Paul II’s arrival at Bologna.

Meanwhile, profound changes had affected the functioning of Iranian intelligence, and the terrorism system it sponsors, in Italy. The chief of Iranian Intelligence in Italy, Hamid Parandeh, had by now not only been exposed as a spy by the Italian security services, but was directly implicated in several terrorist operations and plans. Hamid Parandeh had been in Italy for several years undercover as an Iranian diplomat. He first served with the Iranian Embassy in Rome and later transferred to the Embassy to the Vatican. There, he served as a Press Attaché from August 22, 1995, to January 25, 1996, before his stay in Rome became untenable.

By early 1997, Italy had emerged as the center of regional and European operations. During a visit to Italy, mainly Rome and Milan, in March 1997, Mohsein Rafiq-Dost purchased a building in Milan that was expected to become a new clandestine HQ for the Iranian intelligence and terrorism network. Meanwhile, the support system in B-H had been expanded and made more resilient.

Another Iranian diplomat, Mahmud Nurani, has now emerged as the Rome-based chief of Iranian intelligence. Nurani is a senior terrorist-diplomat who served in Beirut in the early 1980s as the forward representative of Mohtashemi-Pur. In this capacity, he was instrumental in the organization of the HizbAllah and in its launching of a series of bombing operations in Beirut, as well as the launching of the hostage-taking campaign. Nurani’s appointment highlights the network’s priorities. The entire Iranian and terrorism establishment was jolted into action in the Fall of 1997 after the nomination of Qorban Ali Najaf-Abadi, a confidant of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamene‘i, as Minister of Intelligence.

Presently, Nurani’s most important mission is overseeing the expansion of the Iranian intelligence hub in Albania, consolidating a Muslim Axis into Bosnia, Italy and northwards into Austria-Germany; the source of hi-tech and strategic materials for Iran’s strategic industries.

Albania became ripe for Iranian penetration and subversion in the mid-1990s. Albania emerged after the Cold War as a European country with a Third World economy. The collapse of its all-embracing communism, along with its first exposure to Western media images and its proximity to wealthy Italy, resulted in an overwhelming desire to attain Western standards of living.

organized crime, initially by Albanians and Italians, later joined by a host of mafias from China to Russia to the Middle East, became the primary exploiting element of Albania’s plight. Albania became a primary artery for the flow of arms, drugs, counterfeit and other goods controlled by Italian and international organized crime entities.

This surge of criminality also created a backlash in Albania’s simple, rural and morally straightforward society. The “solution” to social ills which promises salvation from both criminality and present day chaos and poverty: Islam.

After months of tumultuous social breakdown and populist revolt, Tiranë is so desperate for socio-economic aid from any quarter, that it does not regulate these activities. Furthermore, large segments of the population are amenable to doing just about anything, particularly if their activities are coated with religious-moralistic slogans.

These two factors facilitate Iranian deep penetration of Albania. Tehran’s penetration is conducted on two levels. Overtly, the Iranians and their Islamist counterparts have built up a comprehensive financial support network: from banks and institutions to run the formal economy to a web of humanitarian organizations offering all types of social services. Beneath this, a clandestine web forms an operational intelligence base for all of Europe.

There have been several clear indications of the importance of the Albanian initiative. A recent meeting of Iran’s Supreme Economic Council of Iran was devoted to the situation in Albania. Vice-President Behezad Navabi, now entrusted with the task of coordinating the overt socio-economic initiatives in Albania, summoned to this meeting such senior officials as Mohsen Nourbakhsh, the Governor of Iran’s Central Bank, and top officials from the relevant ministries. Moreover, Navabi is instructed to coordinate his activities with Iran’s intelligence system. Navabi instructed the officials to draw up and begin implementing a long-term plan aimed to expedite the realization of Tehran’s three main long-term objectives in Albania: (1) To set up a commercial bridgehead not too far from the heart of Europe; (2) To consolidate a strategic axis along the Sarajevo-to-Tiranë line by expanding subversive and Islamist-political presence; and (3) To organise a forward base for Iranian intelligence from where it would be possible to launch infiltration missions into Italy, Austria, Greece, and onward into the heart of Western Europe.

Implementation of Tehran’s designs is already set in motion. Working through Iran’s various semi-official foundations and funds, Iranian intelligence has already established “contacts” with the numerous Iranian and Islamist trading initiatives in the main cities of Albania, as well as channeled funds for the launching of many more such initiatives. Meanwhile, Tehran is making an all-out effort to economically bolster, and boost ties with, the Albanian Arab-Islamic Bank (AAIB). By making the AAIB the primary instrument for the flow of foreign currency into Albania, while placing several loyalists of Tehran at the top, Tehran transformed the bank into an institution which makes every effort to smooth the economic and legal path for Iranian penetration. Indeed, the AAIB has already established formal ties with a series of Iranian banks. Mohsen Nourbakhsh has instructed these banks to set up operations in Albania irrespective of the economic viability and risks of these ventures. Tehran’s own economic intelligence functionaries are deployed throughout the Iranian financial institutions in Albania. Taken together, these activities put Iran in a unique position of near dominance over the Albanian financial system.

Concurrently, Iranian intelligence is stepping up its involvement with the activities of organized crime in and out of Albania. Since the early 1990s, these ports have been used by Iranian intelligence and its allies for the smuggling of drugs and weapons for B-H, as well as a point of transfer of counterfeit funds and drugs from the Middle East to the Italian mafia. As a rule, the large-volume logistics operations have been conducted through the Albanian port of Durrës, while smaller but more sensitive cargoes were shipped via Sendein (north of Durrës).

However, by mid-1997, Albania has become the center of the primary illicit traffic routes which cross the Balkans: arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina, drugs from the Middle East and Colombia for Western Europe, and funds from Russia for laundering in the West. The Italian mafia is a dominant force. The geographical proximity of southern Italy has created a dangerous link between the Mafia networks of southern Italy and the Albanians. Together, they orchestrate the rôle of the foreigners who become increasingly active on the Albanian scene: the Russian mafiya; the fledgling Montenegrin organized crime groups; as well as the fully integrated drug trafficking mafias and terrorist organizations from Kosovo and from the Middle East, particularly Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran, Syria-Lebanon and Turkey.

On the Italian side of the Adriatic, the Apulian mafia has been described as “the top dog” of the illegal traffic system between Europe and Asia via the Brindisi-Tiranë link. The new Sacra Corona Unita [United Sacred Crown], that is also known as “the fourth mafia”, is a well organized and structured top-down decision-making mafia that presently exercises undisputed reign over the provinces of Brindisi, Lecce, and Taranto. The Apulian mafia has transformed Italy’s southern ports into a primary venue for the entry of illegal goods and people into Italy and onward into the rest of Europe. On the criminal front, the most active sectors are the trafficking in arms, drugs, prostitution, and usury. On top, there is a rapidly expanding flow of illegal immigrants of every nationality, a phenomenon now exploited by Iranian intelligence to insert agents and terrorists into Europe.

Meanwhile, the wars throughout the former Yugoslavia have revived the traditional arms trafficking across the Adriatic. The Russian mafiyas and their Albanian counterparts still dominate this trade in the Balkans. On the Italian side, virtually the entire Italian criminal organizations with access to the Adriatic coast now take part in illegal weapons trafficking. The Italian mafia cells prefer to operate out of the Emilia-Romagna region because of the money-laundering possibilities offered by the Romagna riviera’s tourist industry. The Italian mafias buy everything — weapons of all kinds, as well as chemical and bacteriological substances and strategic nuclear materials. Most of these weapons are resold to governments and terrorist entities they run or sponsor. The radioactive materials are rerouted to the Middle East, often in exchange for drugs. The main shipping routes for this trade passes through Albania and Apulia.

The historic route of illegal immigrants entering Europe from the East passes through Trieste or the Apulian ports. Presently, Albania has become a staging area for immigrants from most Asian states, including China. They arrive at Italian shores via Durresi. Dominating the traffic between Durresi and Brindisi, the mafia has also organized the traffic of illegal immigrants. People are inserted by small very fast and powerful motorboats that land entire families of illegal immigrants on the Apulian shores in the space of two to three hours. Upon arrival in Italy, they are picked up by special “taxi services” that bring them to mafia-run “camps” further inland where a sorting-out process takes place and where often the immigrants' ultimate future is decided. The vast majority are smuggled onward toward Italy’s and Europe’s northern regions. Iranian intelligence is exploiting this massive illegal flow of humanity in order to clandestinely infiltrate and insert its own terrorists and operatives into Europe. If any of these individuals is caught, he will be considered yet another illegal migrant, rather than the spy or terrorist that he is, and be treated accordingly.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to expand their training and recruitment in Albania, preparing more and better operatives for infiltration into both Kosovo and Western Europe.

The recruitment process is based on the outreach to the impoverished population in Albania. The Iranians have established a number of foundations alongside their banks that are engaged in humanitarian services and charities. Most important is the “construction Jihad” which is directly affiliated with Iranian intelligence via Tehran’s semi-officials founds. In Albania, the Jihad operates as a highly-motivated organization with ample funding. It is involved in encouraging small trade, in setting up small factories, and generally, in creating jobs in urban and other impoverished areas. Through its social and economic work, the Jihad has become a formidable instrument, making it very easy for the Iranians to conquer the peoples’ hearts as well as gain popularity and consensus in a wide social context. This kind of a social environment creates favorable conditions for recruitment of individuals and the solicitation of active support from institutions — be they port facilities, factories, or financial entities.

Moreover, the key Sunni Islamist associations, such as Al-Haramain and Al-Muwafaq, which concentrate on proselytizing for Islam, constitute another instrument for extending Iranian influence. Relying on donations from the Persian Gulf states and the possibility of high-paying jobs in these oil states, these institutions represent an attraction for a wide segment of the young population. In reality, these associations are mainly used to recruit and to train Albanian mujahedin. Their recruitment methods are those perfected in Afghanistan and Bosnia.

Under the guise of diversified Islamic educational institutions and rural area development projects, the Iranians and their Arab Islamist allies have established training camps in a variety of remote areas in Albania. In order to run these camps, Tehran transferred numerous groups of Arab and Albanian mujahedin from Bosnia. After a brief stay in these Albanian special training camps, special teams made of either veteran mujahedin or recently trained Albanians are sent out of the country. A large number cross into Kosovo either directly or via Macedonia. The high-quality assets are sent into Western Europe mixed in with the large groups of desperate refugees that cross the Straits of Otranto every night.

Meanwhile, by late 1997, the Tehran-sponsored training and preparations of the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK — Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves — in Albanian, OVK in Serbian), as well as the transfer of weapons and experts via Albania, were being increased. Significantly, Tehran’s primary objective in Kosovo has evolved from merely assisting a Muslim minority in distress to furthering the consolidation of the Islamic strategic axis along the Sarajevo-to-Tiranë line. And only by expanding and escalating subversive and Islamist-political presence can this objective be attained.

In the Fall of 1997, the uppermost leadership in Tehran ordered the IRGC High Command to launch a major program for shipping large quantities of weapons and other military supplies to the Albanian clandestine organizations in Kosovo. Khamene‘i’s instructions specifically stipulated that the comprehensive military assistance was aimed to enable the Muslims “to achieve the independence” of the province of Kosovo. This Iranian decision constitutes a change in policy. Until recently, Tehran restricted direct funding on the territory of Yugoslavia to such programs as funding of educational programs of the separatist groups and their Islamic indoctrination, as well as the financing of mosques and related religious and social-humanitarian activities. The funding of terrorist and subversive activities was limited to preparatory and support activities outside Yugoslavia: in B-H, Albania, Iran, Afghanistan-Pakistan, etc.  

Now, the IRGC was ordered to eliminate even this thin distinction. Indeed, by early December 1997, Iranian intelligence had already delivered the first shipments of hand grenades, machine-guns, assault rifles, night vision equipment, and communications gear from stockpiles in Albania into Kosovo. The mere fact that the Iranians could dispatch the first supplies within a few days and in absolute secrecy reflect extensive advance preparations made in Albania in anticipation for such instructions from Tehran. Moreover, the Iranians began sending promising Albanian and UCK commanders for advanced military training in al-Quds forces and IRGC camps in Iran. Meanwhile, weapons shipments continue. Thus, Tehran is well on its way to establishing a bridgehead in Kosovo.

While the UCK is the primary beneficiary of Iranian military support, in determining the extent of the effort to be made Tehran is working with estimates made back in the mid-1990s by followers of Dr Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK], on the requirements for an armed struggle in Kosovo. The study was prepared by Zaim Berisha, a former lieutenant-colonel in the Yugoslav People’s Army, with the assistance of Ejup Dragaj. (Both were sentenced to six and a half years in gaol in Yugoslavia for subversive activities.)

Berisha and Dragaj developed the administrative and structural organization of the army of the Kosovo republic. By their calculations, Kosovo would need a liberation army of 40,000 men equipped with 288,000 items of weaponry: including 26,250 automatic assault rifles, 2,250 machine guns, 5,500 revolvers, 10,450 submachine guns, 850 mortars of various calibres, 182,750 hand grenades, as well as other various lethal devices, and ammunition. The calculations made by Berisha and Dragaj do not include the weapons which the Kosovo Albanians already possess clandestinely.

Berisha and Dragaj envisage the Kosovo armed forces to be comprised of 18 brigades (three for Pristina, two each for Podujevo and Kosovska Mitrovica, and one each for Vucitrn, Glogovac, Pec, Prizren, Gnjilane, Urosevac, Kacanik, Djakovica, Decane, Klina, and the area in and around Drenic). Each brigade is supposed to consist of 2,000-2,500 men. The brigades will be grouped into three corps (Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica, and Urosevac) with 12,000 to 15,000 men each, as well as a number of special purpose units answering directly to the high command. For the initial stage of the liberation struggle, the army would need two sets of infantry munitions rations for each unit. This amounts to around 86-million rounds of ammunition and mortar shells, plus permanent stocks of ammunition for reserves.

The liberation army was to be only the first phase in building military power. Ultimately, the Kosovo Albanians must field such heavy weapons as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and rocket launchers, if they hope to evict the Serbian forces from Kosovo. The force planning of Berisha and Dragaj envisages that their forces will be supplied with these weapons by the Muslim world and the West through Albania, very much along the same principles of weapons supplies to Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s.

In early December 1997, Fazli Veliu, chairman of the People’s Movement of Kosovo Party [LPK] branch for the diaspora, noted a similar trend in the long-term development plans of the UCK. “The creation of [the UCK] begins with guerilla groups, platoons, and then reaches a point where it becomes a people’s army. Indications that it [the UCK] is a disciplined and properly led army have already been given.” Indeed, the growing Iranian involvement in Albania-Kosovo has an immediate impact on the operational structure and organisation of the UCK. The recent reorganization of UCK is strongly influenced by the approach of Berisha and Dragaj to building a national liberation army. The UCK is presently divided into four theaters of operations. The possible locations of these theaters are:

Meanwhile, there is growing grassroots support and acceptability to the UCK and the policies it represents — militancy and radicalism — throughout Kosovo. The spate of UCK terrorism during the Fall of 1997, particularly the attacks in the Srbica Municipality and the village of Vojnik, as well as the kidnapping of Bozidar Spasic, the Obilic police chief, in the middle of Pristina should be considered intentional provocations against the Serbian police aimed to elicit a massive retaliation that would in turn lead to a popular uprising. Thus, the ongoing terrorism campaign in Kosovo should be considered the initial phases in implementing the call for an uprising.

Iran-sponsored activists have already spread the word through Kosovo that the liberation war has already broken out. If current trends prevail, the increasingly Islamist UCK will soon become the main factor in overturning the long-term status quo in the region. Concurrently, the terrorist activities have become part of everyday life throughout Kosovo. Given the extent of the propaganda campaign and the assistance provided by Iran, the spread of terrorism should indeed be considered the beginning of an armed rebellion that threatens a major escalation.

Tehran’s greatest achievement is in its ability to consolidate a genuine Kosovo-Albanian political alliance behind the UCK and its campaign of terrorism. The UCK can thus claim, and not without justification, to be implementing the policy of a genuine political bloc. This newly formed political bloc is comprised of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo led by Adem Demaci, the Democratic Christian Party of Kosovo led by academician Redzep Qosja, and the Union of Independent Trade Unions led by Hajrulahu Gorani. Moreover, Demaci has already made a deal with the prime minister in exile, Bujar Bukoshi according to which Demaci would be “President of the Republic of Kosovo” while Bukoshi would remain the “Prime Minister” beyond his current term.  

Concurrently, Veliu stated that the UCK is neither “some part of the LPK’s body”, nor “the armed wing of the LPK, but [is using the LPK’s organ] to make the public at home and abroad clear about its existence and its liberation activity, about the victories and the relevant responsibilities. The liberation army undoubtedly has the overall support of the LPK, but it is not part of this party and does not belong only to this party. The army enjoys the support of the people of Kosova and belongs to them.” Veliu stressed that no Kosovo-Albanian political party controls the UCK. “The fact that this army is autochthonous [ie: originating from that land] is indisputable.”

Ultimately, however, these politicians are trying to place themselves in relation to the only force in Kosovo generating genuine public support: the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK). By late 1997, public opinion polls throughout Kosovo ascertained that the UCK enjoys the support of over 65 percent of the population, that is, nearly twice as much as all the other political parties combined. Furthermore, the support for the UCK and its radical violent policies is overwhelming among the young people who also expect that the UCK will be institutionalized as a leading force of the political separatist movement. Little wonder, therefore, that most Kosovo-Albanian politicians strive to associate themselves with the UCK in one form or another.  

The primary obstacle to the rise of the radical camp is Dr Ibrahim Rugova, and the mainstream LDK. Demaci, Bukoshi, and Qosja are convinced that Rugova’s policies are too moderate and that he should therefore be discredited and removed. Demaci even claims he has already obtained support for Rugova’s ouster from more than half the members of the “Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo”. However, given Rugova’s international standing and position vis-à-vis the US and the West as a whole, his ouster is bound to harm the Kosovo “cause”. On the other hand, Rugova’s assassination, “by the Serbs” of course, will simultaneously make him a most popular martyr and remove him from active politics. Indeed, there are indications that the UCK’s radical wing is considering the assassination of both Rugova and Fehmi Agani, the LDK deputy chairman, and blaming Belgrade for the killings.

The assassination of Rugova would also be bound to push a large segment of the Albanian population in Kosovo into active participation in an armed struggle. Meanwhile, numerous Kosovo-Albanian leaders openly anticipate the imminent outbreak of a popular armed struggle. For example, Mahmut Bakali, Demaci’s advisor on political strategy, has been giving statements and assessments anticipating such a development with a growing frequency. Similarly, both Gorani and his Union of Independent Trade Unions now declare themselves in favor of a more aggressive and violent policy.

Veliu concurs with this approach. He points out that taken together, the UCK’s operations of late November 1997 should be considered a liberation war. “The attacks simultaneously launched in 14 centers controlled by the occupier and those that occurred in the Drenice area in recent days to defend our people and to carry out the liberation step by step, have drawn the attention of the establishment centers, the state, and military experts. We no longer need to persuade through words, when shooting is heard, when we liberate areas, and when there is optimism to continue, the fight grows.” Thus, by late November, the armed struggle, that is, terrorism and subversion, had become the primary instrument in the Kosovo-Albanian struggle for the liberation of Kosovo.

In December, there was a concurrent and noticeable expansion in the petty violent and terrorist activities of small detachments of the UCK. These were aimed primarily to demonstrate the UCK’s presence in, and create popular awareness of centrality to the struggle for, Kosovo. Adopting IRA-style tactics, masked and armed representatives of the UCK have begun showing up at funerals. Such an appearance in the village of Lausa by three members of UCK at the funeral of an Albanian killed during the latest incidents in Kosovo in the Srbica region was openly interpreted as an unequivocal message that the patience of the Kosovo-Albanian is running out. Meanwhile, local “political” activists point to the intensified activities and preparations at UCK training centers in Donji Prekaz as proof that the Kosovo-Albanians have already started an armed struggle and a terrorism campaign for their independence.

By mid-December 1997, several Albanian leaders in Kosovo were alarmed by the long-term ramifications of the radicalization and Islamicization of their struggle for independence. Most eloquent is Bajram Kosumi, the Chairman of the Kosova Parliamentary Party.

Kosumi believes that “the great majority of the Albanian people” supports the UCK. “The Albanians are interested because they have lost the faith that they can liberate themselves from Serbia through peaceful resistance… The interest of the Albanians in the UCK comes after waiting for seven years for the international community to support the peaceful formation of the state of Kosovo.” Kosumi attributes this failed policy to “a narrow circle in the LDK led by Dr. Rugova.” Furthermore, since “the LDK, with its structural organisations and its own political philosophy, is unable to make a fast or radical move,” Kosumi observes, “the LDK as it appears today in fact does not exist. It will survive a little longer in its present moribund state.”

The grave ramifications of the “collapse of the LDK” are that this event “casts doubt on the philosophy of peaceful resistance as an effective means of solving the issue of Kosovo, which has been personified by the LDK”. In itself, Kosumi argues, this development constitutes a major crisis to the Kosovo movement. “For seven years, the LDK, with its delusions of grandeur, has fought against and destroyed any alternative or even the very idea of any active form of peaceful resistance.” The only successful struggle of the LDK has been against the ideas of Demaci, Qosja, and other leaders.

Therefore, the LDK has created the circumstances for the rise of a radical and drastic challenge as the sole viable alternative to its domination. “The UCK with its military methods has been put forward as the alternative. A people that is enslaved, as the [Kosovo] Albanians are, have the right to use all effective methods for their own liberation.” Kosumi warns that this radicalisation of the struggle for Kosovo is playing into the hands of Belgrade because “it is the lack of any concept of how to solve the Kosovo issue that is pushing Serbian political circles toward war… There is also the possibility that through war they [the Serbs] might win a portion of Kosovo forever.”

Kosumi is grim about the prospects of his people. “Is there any chance of preventing war in Kosovo?  Is there any chance of a fair solution to the Kosovo issue, barring the use of war?  A war to solve this issue would be a triumph of Serbian militarist policy over the Albanian policy of peace and over the peaceful policy of the international community, which, despite is hesitations, has invested something in a peaceful solution of the issue.” Kosumi urges that “the possibility of preventing war must therefore be the main subject of debate for every Albanian political party. Now that the UCK has appeared on the scene, it is not only the LDK, but all the other political parties that find themselves on a knife edge. … The Albanian political parties now face the question of ‘to be or not to be’.”

The main question to be resolved, Kosumi argues, is “what will happen to the political parties if they are not in a situation to activate peaceful resistance?  They will either be destroyed or will move over to collaboration with Belgrade.” Kosumi believes that the LDK is already well on its way to establish a certain form of collaboration with Belgrade. Thus, the key to saving Kosovo from war and destruction lies in the hands of the other opposition parties. “If the[se] parties do not succeed in activating [peaceful political] resistance, war in Kosovo is almost unavoidable,” Kosumi concludes.

Fazli Veliu takes the question of the centrality of the UCK-led armed struggle even further. He stresses that in performing the “essential and indispensable” mission, the UCK “makes serious efforts to liberate the country from the southern Slavs and defends people who face a serious danger of extermination according to the Serbian fascist plans.” Thus, Veliu also sees no alternative to an escalating armed struggle led by the UCK in Kosovo. “The only solution [to the Kosovo problem] is the liberation of areas occupied by the southern Slavs. The UCK, the LPK, and our people will achieve this through pain, sacrifice, and continuous effort until the final war.” Furthermore, Veliu explains, the armed struggle is the only viable instrument for nation-building and the sole catalyst for the political dynamics required to achieve victory. An independent Kosovo, he stresses, “will be achieved through our unity and the creation of a joint military and political front that includes the relevant authorities who would play a lawmaking rôle pending the liberation of the entire country. Meanwhile, the basic institutions of the state will also be established. After liberation, the UCK will play its rôle to defend our state. Now and in the future, the education in the field of military matters should continue to improve and progress, in order to be able to challenge those armies that aim at endangering the overall Albanian autochthonous status.”

Washington’s growing interest in the Kosovo problem should be examined in view of Kosovo’s seemingly inevitable slide to an armed conflict led and dominated by the Iran-sponsored UCK. For the Clinton Administration, Kosovo is the next point of pressure on Belgrade, as demonstrated in the sudden and unwarranted inclusion of the subject in the Dayton II conference on B-H. Given the concurrent Iranian dominance over the rising Islamist subversive and terrorist movement in Kosovo and Albania, is this a mere coincidence or is there another round of tacit cooperation between Washington and Tehran?

There are striking and dangerous parallels between the rise of the Iran-sponsored Islamists in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in Albania and Kosovo. In both cases, the Iranians succeeded to infiltrate an essentially secular and Westernized Muslim community and, by capitalizing on what started as a national liberation struggle, subvert it from within into becoming a bulwark of Islamist terrorism and radicalism. That the Iranians and their allies enjoyed the support of loyal followers within the ranks of aspirant leaders of both movements need not detract from the extent of Tehran’s achievement in Sarajevo, the dire ramifications for Europe's stability of this achievement, and the dire ramifications of a virtually inevitable triumph in Albania/Kosovo/Macedonia unless the international community steps in to actively prevent it.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, goaded by a zealous and activist Clinton Administration, the West and the UN actively supported and facilitated the rise of the Bosnian Muslim Administration. Officially, the Clinton Administration decided to “look the other way” as Iran and its Islamist allies delivered weapons and volunteers to the Bosnian Muslim forces in violation of the UN embargo. The recent discovery of Sarajevo-supported plots against the Pope and sponsorship of Islamist terrorism in the heart of Western Europe has led several European governments to rethink the wisdom of their Bosnian policies.

Hence, why must the West repeat its mistakes in Kosovo? If in B-H, the Clinton Administration could claim that faced with the plight of the Bosnian Muslim civilian population (in itself a fallacy) the US had no alternative but to tacitly permit the flow of Iran-dominated Islamist aid to B-H, there are no comparable circumstances concerning Kosovo. Yet, with the ramifications of Iran's lingering hold over Sarajevo clear, the Clinton White House is actively encouraging the surge of a “Kosovo crisis” while knowing full well that the main local Muslim forces are dominated by Islamist terrorist forces and sponsored by Iran.

There is neither a humanitarian crisis in progress, nor a reason for not knowing the outcome of the rise of militant Islamism, to warrant such a policy.  

 

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